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Abstract The article examines how South Korean civil servants responded to the
introduction of pay for performance. Drawing upon 31 in-depth interviews with career
civil servants, it identifies what became known as 1/n, a form of ‘discreet resistance’
that emerged and evolved. The analytical framework allows productive resistance to be
seen as ebbing and flowing during organisational change that sees institutionalisation,
deinstitutionalisation and re-institutionalisation. In understanding the cultural context
of organisational resistance the contribution is three-fold. First, a nuanced definition
and understanding of productive resistance. Second, it argues that productive resistance
must be seen as part of a process that does not simply reflect ‘offer and counter-offer’
within the change management process. Thirdly, it identifies differences within groups
and sub-cultures concerning commitment towards resistance and how these fissures
contribute towards change as new interpretive schemes and justifications are presented
in light of policy reformulations.
Keywords Culture . Productive resistance . Changemanagement . South Korea .
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Introduction
This article discusses resistance that arose as a response towards the introduction of
Performance Related Pay (P4P) within the Korean public sector. A gap in the
organisational literature is to better understand how resistance can influence workplace
change (see Courpasson et al. 2012), and arguably the ways in which this may occur
across diverse cultural contexts – Confucian as well as Western. Exploring opposition
to change is a valuable exercise (Krantz 1999; Starr 2011; Burnes 2015), including
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understanding how policy recipients respond to policy mandates (McDermott et al.
2013, s112). The article presents public servants’ reactions to change as a ‘discreet’
form of resistance (Fronda 2008):
not explicit resistance (as in conventional revolts or strikes), or a mental pulling-out
from the professional sphere (as in withdrawal), but a form of Bdeviance^ which
complies with the letter of the law but discreetly resists its spirit (Fronda 2008, 591).
We explore whether such discreet resistance had distinctive productive properties.
The notion of ‘productive resistance’ has developed within the organisational studies
literature (Krantz 1999; Ford et al. 2008; Starr 2011; McDermott et al. 2013) to counter
resistance being framed solely as a blockage or counter-rational response to change.
However, the concept of productive resistance remains somewhat ambiguous, and
given this lack of clarity a key task is to sharpen its meanings and situate it within
distinct organisational culture.
By focusing attention on the ‘resistance process’ (van Dijk and van Dick 2009, 144)
there is potential to understand how productive resistance is integrated into organisational
change processes and contributes towards resolution (Erwin and Garman 2010). The
motivational roots of productive resistance will be seen as located not in micro-politics but
in existing organisational culture, with responses less about fear or loss by factions and
more related to established social relations. There is also a methodological imperative
underpinning the discussion if: ‘Resistance has to be judged on its merits and from
multiple perspectives, and the activities of those who see themselves as resistant subjects
must be factored into this analysis’ (Thomas and Hardy 2011, 330). However, as will be
discussed, not all subject will identify as ‘resistant subjects’ and actors may have relatively
little intention behind actions that shape improvements because their emphasis in on
reproducing day-to-day routines. The paper is structured in four parts. First a brief review
of the concepts and literature relating to reaction to change, resistance and, in particular,
productive resistance. Second, overview of the organisational case study context and
research methods adopted. Third, findings, followed fourth, by a discussion of what the
case contributes towards understanding positive resistance.
Reactions to Change and Productive Resistance
Understanding reactions to change initiatives remains a core concern of change man-
agement. Given organisations are inherently peopled environments with inherited
interests, attitudes, egos and expectations, changes in organisational practice, process
and system may evoke distinct emotional and behavioural responses – including shock,
surprise, resigned acceptance, even enthusiastic support. There is also a likelihood of
opposition or resistance to change and this has been a focus within classical, conven-
tional and critical literatures (Coch and French 1948; Watson 1971; Strickland 1998;
Hughes 2010; Pietese et al. 2012). Since Lewin’s writing on resistance and force-field
analysis, divergent literatures have mushroomed across psychology, organisational
studies and political analysis (Patalano 2011; Burnes 2015). Lines (2004, 198) defines
resistance as ‘behaviours that are acted out by change recipients in order to slow down
or terminate an intended organisational change’. These may arise at the individual,
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group or organisational level. Carr and Brower (2000, 114) see bureaucratic resistance
as ‘action or intentional inaction that defies, opposes or sidesteps the rules, roles or
routines of the organization’. Reluctance to accept a change has many guises, including
overt behaviours (strikes, working to rule and lower productivity), and more covert and
passive behaviours to frustrate – such as lateness, absence and reduced engagement and
effort (Ackroyd and Thompson 1999; Fronda 2008).
The roots of resistance are identified as lying in various settings: psychology,
systems, institutional and organisational cultures (Graetz et al. 2002, 260 cited in
Hughes 2010, 167–8). For Kotter and Schlesinger (1979) resistance arises from self-
interest, misunderstanding, different assessments, and low tolerance for change.
Conventional change management and organisational development practice focus on
how resistance should be managed and the removal of barriers (see Linstead et al. 2004,
447 for discussion of this point). Focussing on surface resistance risks seeing only one
face of power, ignoring that some issues never make it to be a focus of change, and how
prevailing structural interests operate around organisations and policy (Lukes 1974).
Sturdy and Grey (2003) point to a ‘pro-change bias’ in the literature and organisational
development is awash with techniques and strategies to remove potential blocks
(Burnes 2009; also Kotter and Schlesinger 1979; Cunningham and Kempling 2009).
This allows a widely accepted mental model that underpins organisational behaviour,
‘the idea that there is resistance to change and that managers must overcome it’ (Dent
and Goldberg 1999, 25). To circumvent staff resistance there is reductionism focused
on communication, education and participation.
Some writers have argued that resistance is a self-serving and potentially self-
fulfilling label, that change agents attribute in seeking to rationalise the response of
recipients to change agendas (Ford et al. 2008). There has been an attempt to acknowl-
edge that resistance is not necessarily a negative response and that rather than resistance
always viewed as a pejorative, ‘productive resistance’ may constitute a bulwark against
rapid and ill-thought out change (Fronda 2008). Piderit (2000, 783) points to positive
intentions behind negative responses to change being ignored and that: ‘what some may
perceive as disrespectful or unfounded opposition might also be motivated by individ-
uals’ ethical principles or by their desires to protect the organization’s best interests’
(2000, 785). Opportunism is not therefore synonymous with self-interested behaviour
(Carr and Brower 2000). For some, the term ‘resistance to change’ is beyond rehabil-
itation (Dent and Goldberg 1999), others focus on reconstructing resistance (Ford et al.
2008), which includes seeing it as a multidimensional concept (Piderit 2000, 789) and
acknowledging how ambivalence and cognitive (beliefs), emotional, and intentional
(behaviour) dimensions complicate our understanding of resistance and change.
Most usage of ‘productive’ (and similarly ‘thoughtful’ or ‘facilitative’ resistance) (see
Thomas and Hardy 2011) has been within the organisational change and ICT imple-
mentation literature (McKay et al. 2012; Ferneley and Sobreperez 2006). However
precise meaning and understanding remains unclear. This has led to suggestions that the
term is ‘something of an oxymoron in which ‘real’ resistance can scarcely be viewed as
positive, and positively intended feedback in order to improve a situation should not be
regarded as resistance’ (McKay et al. 2012, 2). The term also risks establishing a binary
– productive versus unproductive resistance – and questions arise about who decides
whether andwhose behaviours are either one or the other (Ford et al. 2008; McKay et al.
2012; Thomas and Hardy 2011). Attention to how ‘researchers have largely overlooked
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the potentially positive intentions that may motivate negative responses to change’
(Piderit 2000, 783), highlights individuals and groups of individuals as change recipients
who behave in particular ‘intentioned’ways. Notwithstanding calls to view resistance as
multidimensional – for example, Piderit’s distinctions of emotional, cognitive, and
intentional – productive resistance risks assuming an overly purposeful agency. Thus
individuals and groups resist and make suggestions in the form of counter-proposals to
provide better understandings and additional options and solutions to what is currently
on the table (see Binci et al. 2012). Positive resistance becomes somewhat transactional
and strategic and can soon lead to change management advice that: ‘Change resisters
should go a bit further and demand that the person proposing the change prove that what
he or she is proposing is best for the company’ (de Jager 2001, 25). Nor is productive
resistance simply apathy – a more nuanced understanding that reflects organisational
realities and institutional consideration will show that productive outcomes may be
neither clearly intentioned nor simply the result of apathy.
People and groups are embedded in larger structures and cultures and adopting an
institutionalist framework focuses on the informal institutions and cognitive repertoires
upon which they draw – orientating us towards habits, routines and norms (Nielsen
2001; Scott 2001; Meyer 2007). Whilst allowing agency the freedom to deliberate (and
be not simply a rule follower or some version of crude economic man) it is key to
explore how participants are influenced, transformed and completed by informal struc-
tures (Thoenig 2011). Discussion will focus on what is the appropriate response (rather
than simply utility maximisation) and how this shifts in the interpretation of moral codes
and frames of reference (Bell 2002). Social norms are internalised through a range of
processes – recruitment and work practices and these are subject to change: BIdentity is
not fixed but constructed in different ways over time as a result of such factors as career
progression, organizational setting, and the nature of work^ (Thomas and Hardy 2011,
325). The account ensures we do not leave individuals without history, society or
culture, or alternatively ‘drain[s] such relationships of their active, subjective dimen-
sions and their cultural contents and meanings (Emirbeyer and Goodwin 1994, 1428).
The approach acknowledges that micro-interactions take place within an existing social
structure and are shaped by that structure (Lloyd 1986, 188). But the account avoids
over-playing meaning and communication whereby social actors reproduce routines but
where seemingly their meaning-creating capabilities never actually accomplish an
action, transcend or transform a situation (Campbell 1996, 151; also Layder 1994).
Given such accounts this article provides a more detailed illustration of productive
resistance within organisational culture and change (Courpasson et al. 2012). It offers
an in-depth, inductive qualitative examination, valuable because studies are typically
self-report survey studies across organisations (Erwin and Garman 2010; Thomas and
Hardy 2011). The contribution is two-fold: first situating productive resistance within
the ebb and flow of the durée of the organisational change (rather than simply an
episode). Second, it moves beyond seeing resistance as an individual trait (see, Burnes
2015), to examining interventions at individual, group, and organisational levels and
how they challenge individual identity but also group norms and values within
organisations (Erwin and Garman 2010). Thus, the focus is on examining ‘how
resistance to change evolves over time, is influenced by change interventions, the
sequence of interventions, and how it operates at an individual, group, and organiza-
tional levels’ (Erwin and Garman 2010, 50).
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Research Setting
Research was undertaken in the Korean civil service on the general services’ imple-
mentation of Pay for Performance schemes. In-depth interviews were conducted with
public servants in order to focus on processes, behaviours, attitudes and meanings of
the policy change (Creswell 2007; Denzin and Lincoln 2008, 14). Korean society (and
its civil service) is a valuable setting to explore productive resistance given society is
strongly influenced by Confucian ethics, and has been subject to strong NPM reforms.
The case also highlights institutionalisation and de-institutionalisation, not simply
focussing on the persistence of phenomena to the neglect of how change happens
(Dacin et al. 2002)
Within Korean society five basic principles together contribute to maintaining a
traditional hierarchy system of family, community and administration (Song 1990;
Sagong 1993). In particular, respect for elders plays an important role and impacts on
the seniority system in Korean society, indirectly recommending that seniority be
favoured in promotion, evaluation and performance appraisal. Second, ‘respect for
honour’ directly influences civil service motivation and identity, with civil service seen
as high in the traditional social class hierarchy (Ko 2002, 376; also Frederickson 2002).
Third, collectivism influences all levels of group and community social interaction.
Fourth, the Confucian ethic elevates family, and this concept of family expands to
groups, organisations and communities (Yoon 2001). Leadership is strongly transac-
tional, incorporating top-down control with paternalistic care for employees’ personal
and family needs (cf McCarthy et al. 2008). Finally, personal connections (blood
networks, regional networks and school networks) are fundamental to relationships
(Kim and Hoppe-Graff 2001; Sung 2003; Jung 2007). In summary, Koreans are
traditionally collectivistic in outlook, emphasise homogeneity and when measured on
performance orientation, institutional collectivism, and in-group collectivism
Confucian countries score highly, reflecting a results-driven orientation that prefers
group work over individual goals (Hofstede 2001; Northouse 2012). Confucianism
shapes family relations and practices, influences education and examinations (Kim
2009) and is embedded within institutional structures. It is simply the ‘way things are
done around here’ (Deal and Kennedy 1982).
The traditional career-based civil service system is strongly derivative of these
Confucian values – seen in the rigid examinations entry system and prevailing sense
of duty (Frederickson 2002). Korean civil servants working in ‘career service’ pass an
entrance examination and are expected to make a life-long commitment to the service
with legal status and job security guaranteed by law. General civil servants within the
administrative and research fields are employed within eight strong vertical classifica-
tions and a pyramid hierarchy (Senior Civil Service, and Grades 3–9).
Qualitative Study Methods
The research utilised personal networks and past work experience for opportunities to
contact relevant officials (see Taylor 2011). A sample of 31 was drawn from across four
ministries chosen to give a range with interviewee selection balanced (using a matrix to
consider characteristics being met and missing) in terms of rank, method of entry,
length of employment and gender (see Tables 1 and 2 below). The gender imbalance of
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Table 1 Ministry distribution of the sample and their seniority
Category SCS (Senior Civil Service) Division director (Grade 3–4) Deputy division director (Grade 4–5) Lower- ranked staff (Grade 6–9) Total
(Performance related annual salary) (Performance bonus programme)
A Ministry 3 2 4 2 11
B Ministry 2 2 1 2 7
C Ministry 1 2 2 1 6
D Ministry 1 3 1 2 7
Total 7 9 8 7 31
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Table 2 Length of service of sample
Category SCS Division director Deputy division director Lower- ranked staff Total (%)
Scheme 1 (Performance related annual salary) (Performance bonus programme)
Over 25 years 2 2 4 (12.0%)
Over 20 years 4 1 2 1 8 (25.8%)
Over 15 years 2 2 (6.5%)
Over 10 years 4 1 3 8 (25.8%)
Over 5 years 3 2 5 (16.1%)
Up to 5 years 1 2 1 4 (12.9%)
Total 7 9 8 7 31 (100%)
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the sample (7 out of 31 participants were female) means this study has not introduced a
gender dimension to analysis – an acknowledged limitation.
The researcher was a civil servant on study leave from the Korean public service
raising issues of insider status. In the South Korean context insider/outsider is not
reducible to a simple binary, but more complicated to reflect Confucian orderings and
multiple status/identities (Kim 2012; see also Mercer 2006). Within projects researchers
may not be uniformly insiders but also embrace identities of stranger, visitor or initiate
(Flick 1998, 59–61). Arguably, personal networks helped obtain richer data, and
numerous respondents expressed the view that prior connections facilitated a smoother
discussion. By contrast, it was sometimes more difficult to build rapport with respon-
dents recruited via a process of recommendation – similar obstacles to undertaking elite
interviews are identified elsewhere (e.g. Harvey 2011). The research study gained
ethics approval from an institutional ethics committee, with attention paid to confiden-
tiality, informed consent, anonymity, insider status, and data storage. Interviews were
conducted, transcribed and analysed in Korean, and final analysis was translated into
English. The data was handled using the ‘framework method’ of thematic analysis
(Ritchie and Spencer 1993; Ritchie and Lewis 2003; Richards 2009). This allowed a
search for conceptual definitions, typologies, classifications, form and nature (process,
system, attitudes, behaviours), and explanations (Miles and Huberman 1994).
Within East Asian organisations methodological challenges exist to conducting
research, including difficulties of gaining access to steep hierarchical organisations,
the lack of a critical social science tradition, and the strong preference for quantitative
methodologies. The fieldwork underpinning this article navigated such sensitivities and
examines evolution of reactions, including emergent forms of professional and mana-
gerial responses. The ability to look retrospectively at the change offers insights for
understanding shifts in organisational culture, and to grasp the interactions of the
professional cultural codes and the external policy drivers (see Sandelowski 1999).
Inevitably qualitative research of events that occurred some years earlier bring signif-
icant limitations of recall and also post-hoc rationalisation and these should be
acknowledged (Morse et al. 2008). Longitudinal work would allow research to further
explore conceptual and theoretical insights but was not available within this study. As
such, data here is presented in a way that observes a precautionary principle – avoiding
overstepping the boundaries of what may reasonably be inferred from the data along-
side its triangulation with wider literature and documents.
Organisational Culture and Reactions to P4P
The performance-based pay system saw two types of programmes introduced. First,
those at senior grade (division director grade and above) receive performance related
pay that accrues to the following year’s basic salary. Such senior managers are
appraised with four grades, and only the upper 20% of employees can be given an
Excellent grade, whilst the bottom 10% are ineligible for P4P. The grades are deter-
mined mainly by performance appraisal (including 360 degree feedback) based on a
Performance Agreement. Performance pay is paid once a year spread out evenly into
monthly salary, and added to the base pay of the following year. Second, mid and lower
level managers (Grade 4 non-division director, Grade 5 and below) have a Performance
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Bonus Programme with a single payment. This Performance Bonus Programme has the
same categories of P4P grades and a forced ratio of ranking allocation (lowest 10%
denied a bonus) and grades also determined mainly by performance appraisal. The
reward is paid as a lump sum bonus and the amount depends on grade.
The policy mandate for P4P in the early 2000s was top-down and focused on vision
and implementation in a classic command and control style (Jenkins 1978;Sturdy and
Grey 2003; Burnes 2009; Hughes 2010). Its introduction into both the wider Korean
public service and the central civil service evoked distinct responses. Nearly 80,000
teachers from a trade union of teachers (jungyojo) responded by returning their
performance dividend of 28 billion Korean won to the authorities (Kim 2004, 527).
In comparison the response of central civil servants was more passive, but not
apathetic, and in some ministries a behavioural response involved performance bonuses
being collected and redistributed equally by staff among peer groups within the same
rank (the practice of ‘1/n’) (Im 2003).
The narrative of the rise, emergence and fall of 1/n is usefully presented in three parts to
illuminate the complexities of productive resistance. Thus we examine emergence of 1/n
(its institutionalisation); the decline of 1/n (what is in effect de-institutionalisation); and the
reintroduction of seniority-based principles (the re-institutionalisation of previous values).
1) The emergence of 1/n practice
The practice of 1/n was prevalent with the first distribution of performance rewards
around 2001. Given nine interviewees (from 31) were civil servants for less than
10 years they could not have participated in 1/n when the practice was at its height.
Indeed the sample falls into broad groups: those that participated; those that did not;
and those that could not because they entered public service after the decline of the
practice. Thus, almost half of the eligible sample took part in 1/n and additionally the
whole sample expressed opinions and insights on the 1/n process.
For many respondents 1/n was an expression of opposition to the newly introduced
individual incentive scheme. However, this opposition was less an individual trait of
resistance than an expression of group and sub-organisational loyalty. Concerns that
P4P would lead to disharmony led to a collective response shaped by the organisational
context. More overt opposition was problematic on two grounds: the prevailing
ideational assumption of obedience and lack of dissent tradition in public service;
second, structurally there was absence of any clear vehicle or strategy to harness
opposition. At the time of P4P’s introduction, there was no legal trade union for
Korean civil servants and absence of such route or precedent for reacting against
perceived negative impacts meant that:
[As they became increasingly] aware of the potential negative impacts of P4P,
they figured out a solution to avoid them. The redistribution could let them
manage the situation quietly without provoking problems… (P17: Senior Civil
Service, started from Grade 5).
Thus 1/n was seen as being more in tune with core values of the service and
responses were not perceived as parochialism or a short-term defense. The response
was rooted in collectivist belief of familial-type relationships, and mutual cooperation
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as a key virtue. P4P with its assumptions of competitive individualism had the potential
to create disharmony in these relationships amongst members:
We all do our best to accomplish the given tasks. So how can you make a
ranking... The tasks of a regional office are relatively simple; mainly implemen-
tation of a policy. Given the circumstances, appraisals are unacceptable if we
consider our traditional perspective … we face each other every day. I am not
confident that I am superior to others, or that colleagues are less productive. So
we reached the conclusion that redistributing equally is the best solution (P12:
lower ranked staff, started from Grade 9).
All lower ranked staff interviewees had participated in the practice, except two
respondents who had ‘team-based’ P4P. As the team (bureau)-based P4P provided the
same amount of rewards within a bureau, it had a similar logic to 1/n practice, so the
civil servants involved had little need to embrace 1/n. Explanations for participation by
lower ranked staff in 1/n included the sub-cultural context of a stronger sense of
comradeship and continued adherence to traditional values of collectivism that exist
amongst lower ranked staff.
By contrast, higher and middle ranking officials showed less enthusiasm towards
this practice. None of the Senior Civil Service, and only a minority of division
directors, participated in the practice and, given their managerial status, they perceived
an obligation to follow official policy. Senior Civil Service viewed 1/n as problematic
because it made it difficult to distinguish high and low performers. So why did some
division directors originally participate in 1/n but not others? The answer lies in those
participants having risen up the hierarchy, occupied distinct social roles, and during that
rise having worked together with older ‘non-elite’ colleagues, who emphasised tradi-
tional collective values. Thus, they felt obliged to participate within a workplace
atmosphere focussed on relationships, where highlighting individual performance
was considered distasteful and civil servants did not wish to stand out amongst
colleagues. Those who joined the civil service before 2000 were also more likely to
have participated in the 1/n practice.
There was a spatial distribution of differential interests and attitudes. Thosewhoworked
in regional branches were more likely to participate than those in headquarters. Regional
office employees identified strong beliefs supporting 1/n: namely, colleagues are family-
like and all jobs equal in terms of importance and responsibility. There was also a work-
location structural context – in regional offices with relatively few staff, there was greater
pressure to maintain personal relationships than in headquarters, where a larger group of
employees lacked personal relationships. Interestingly, one lower ranked staff member
who led the 1/n practice at his regional branch changed views on the acceptability of 1/n
when he subsequently worked at headquarters where the prevailing sub-culture differed.
What does this experience of 1/n add to the understanding of ‘productive resistance?
Does it for example support Piderit’s (2000, 783, 785) suggestion that potentially
positive intentions may be behind ‘negative’ responses? In the case reported so far,
emergence of 1/n was underpinned by a desire to safeguard the organisational fabric – a
collective identity premised on strong networks of relations and reciprocity. Whilst the
example shares some similarities with instances whereby professional resistance
emerges from change fatigue (e.g. Greasley et al. 2009; Clement 2014) this was not
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the major driver of the 1/n response. As a form of organisation-based resistance 1/n
illustrates a clash between new systems of P4P and existing organisational structures
and cultures. It is a threat to more established social relations – within which work-
based identity is situated (also, O’Toole 1995; van Dijk and van Dick 2009, 144).
The response is productive when viewed from the vantage of securing support for
existing organisational values but the response was not one offering clear ‘counter
proposals’ by resistant subjects. Drawing upon the motivations and responses of the
‘resistance process’ (van Dijk and van Dick 2009, 144), illustrate how resisting ‘the
cultural colonisation of their identities’ (see, Fleming and Spicer 2003) may result in a
very distinct collective response, influenced by traditional values, and that here was
unique to Korea. There should be caution therefore in defining productive resistance in
a way that is overly Anglo-centric and which makes assumptions about motive and
intention. The comments of Fronda (2008, 603) around ‘cultural resistance’ are partic-
ularly relevant whereby:
We mean here that people were attached to a symbolic set of terms of reference,
or to Bvalues^, causing them [to] refuse Bas best they can^ the announced
predominance of another symbolic reference, of other values, stemming from a
political philosophy and society choices which are specifically Anglo-Saxon.
2) Development and decline of 1/n practice
The practice of 1/n was most pervasive in 2001 when the performance bonus was
first distributed. However the practice had several manifestations and these evolved
over time: redistribution whereby equal amounts went to each division or bureau
employee; equal net distribution (following deduction of taxes); and redistribution that
narrowed the gap between high and low P4P grades. At first, rewards were distributed
equally and employees combined and then divided bonuses amongst employees in the
division or bureau. There was a change to net rather than gross distribution because
under the first method those initially awarded larger bonuses received lower rewards in
the final distribution due to income tax deductions compared with colleagues deemed
low performers! Thirdly, emerging disputes over redistribution practices amongst
employees led to new distributions which sought to narrow the gap between high
and low P4P graders, instead of distributing identical amounts.
The practice had mostly disappeared in central government by 2008, although a
regional branch where lower ranked staff worked still operated the practice at this time.
(By contrast, local government officials are still currently practicing ‘1/n’ and are criticised
for continuing the practice). Most respondents believed there were good reasons for the
practice in the early 2000s but that it was no longer acceptable a decade later. Even
respondents who had originally participated agreed the practice had since lost its justifi-
cation.Why did the practice evolve and subsequently disappear from central government?
There are some exogenous considerations that contributed to deinstitutionalization
of the 1/n practice. What was then the Civil Service Commission (CSC), responsible
for establishing and overseeing performance policy, became aware of what they
regarded as dysfunctional responses to P4P and issued guidance for individual minis-
tries to crack down on the practice (CSC 2001; 2002). For example, ministries were
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warned that the overall size of P4P rewards would be reduced, if such a practice was
observed in a ministry. Senior management and supervisors received political direction
around the importance of implementing P4P. The possibility of Departments and
Ministries undergoing audit and investigation might likely have contributed to the
changed context. As a division director admitted:
A strong external warning from our government terminated the practice of 1/n.
Without these warnings being issued, civil servants might be still engaged in the
practice. I think that it disappeared because the authority officially prohibited the
practice with the help of regulation (P3: division director, started from Grade 9).
However, civil servants had also harbored an instrumental distrust of the appraisal
system used for determining rewards as well as a commitment to collectivist values.
Respondents perceived rudimentary appraisal methods being used to determine chang-
es in salary. The response of 1/n informed the development of the P4P system, which,
in turn, undermined 1/n. Thus MOSPA continuously revised the system to reflect civil
servants’ concerns, complaints and reactions. There were changes to the appraisal
system and the rewards architecture – ‘productive’ outcomes of the reaction to ac-
knowledge the importance of how total rewards are valued within the local context and
of ensuring P4P is applied fairly and consistently so employees view them as legitimate
(McCarthy et al. 2008, 232).
Given the development of appraisal methods and changes in the perception of
supervisors (CSC 2003, 2004) the results of performance management were perceived
more favorably. A lower ranked staff member suggested:
When we practiced 1/n, the appraisal was not fair. However, now we have
improved appraisals… we have 360 degree feedback appraisal from supervisors
and peer groups. It makes a huge difference. I feel it has become much fairer
(P12: lower ranked staff, started from Grade 9).
When P4P was first introduced, the difference in rewards between high and low P4P
grades was relatively small, which many felt comfortable with redistributing. However
MOSPA also enlarged the size of P4P rewards and as these became larger, many civil
servants revised their views:
As the size increased, civil servants started showing greater commitment to the
rewards... It is awkward to share £2,000-3,000 with others because it is beyond
an amount for just dining together with drinks. In a division, some are winners
and the others are losers; it has become more difficult to speak publicly of
sharing or redistribution (P1: division director, started from Grade 5).
How did altering the P4P scheme (e.g. increasing rewards) sit within prevailing values
and culture? Earlier we noted that Korean culture is broadly collectivist in outlook and
unlikely to immediately embrace some public management reforms. The revision of P4P
appeared to involve some intensification of incentives – the very thing that 1/n had
opposed. So why did resistance soften rather than harden? Here a discontinuity should
be acknowledged in the acceptance and taken-for-grantedness that earlier had recreated
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the cultural norms. ‘Institutions are understood as models that provide substantive guides
for practical action. Institutions are durable to the extent that these models are reinforced
through socialization or interaction or legitimation while alternative scripts remain un-
imaginable’ (Clemens and Cook 1999, 445). At this point it is necessary to invoke the
precautionary principle raised earlier. To isolate culture change is relatively difficult and
care should be taken to not overstep what the evidence – both study evidence and wider
social science – tells us about culture change. Elsewhere scholars have pointed to the
three-way distinction of attitudes, values and culture (Hudson et al. 2014) and this is a
relevant analytical device here. Thus attitudes may have a significant degree of instability,
influenced as they are by immediate surrounding socio-economic conditions. Culture, by
contrast, relates to dominant traditional or religious beliefs (such Confucianism) that have
moulded fundamental aspects of society. Societal values lie in between, representing
resilient ideas regarding what is desirable in organisational or social contexts, but being far
less abstract than culture (Hudson et al. 2014).
There are indications that Korean values are changing given it has experienced
growing interdependence with Western values and traditions. Some facets of compet-
itive individualism are mirrored in Korean society (including a rampant examination
competition). In the private sector lifetime employment is no longer guaranteed and
human resource management has changed from seniority-based to performance- and
competency-based following the introduction of greater competition within organisa-
tions (Park 2001). Wider changes are also reported, including erosion of respect for
seniors and elders (Kim 1996), and individual goals and aspirations becoming more
difficult to overlook alongside wider group goals. A cohort effect is evident and the
workforce born after 1980 are considered different in that they place growing emphasis
on individual values due to the growing hegemony of Western culture globally. The
authority of the public sector has also been assailed with the rapid expansion of the
private sector during the 1990s. A shrinking government role provided opportunity to
question the motivation of civil servants with challenges to the longstanding social
hierarchy (also Park 2010, 203 for support).
Against this wider backdrop of value change it is possible to situate interviewee
responses from the study. They point to a nascent individualism alongside mainstay
organisational traditions and practices and perhaps this offers insight concerning the
acceptance of P4P:
When we were young, if supervisors ordered [food], all the employees ordered
the same food. 1 However, these days, younger guys clearly show their own
preference. Likewise, within our workplace, young civil servants tend to state
their own opinion. They are a different generation from ours (P3: division
director, started from Grade 9).
As Oliver (1992), 575) writes: ‘New members with backgrounds and experiences
that differ from existing members bring different interpretive frameworks and social
definitions of behaviour to the organization that act to diminish consensus and unques-
tioning adherence to take-for-granted practices’.
1 The order of ordering food also starts from supervisor to lower ranked staff.
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Some of those who were graded highly and seen as high performers wished to
personalise their own achievements and so refrained from redistributing bonuses. They
were, in effect, less sensitive to criticism of being self-interested. Conversely, the 1/n
practice was now criticised for being unfair because it treated equally both hard
working and less committed employees. One division director explained:
I would say the ‘culture’ has changed from a ‘concession culture’ to a ‘compet-
itive culture’… In particular, competition has increased within the same ranks
with similar careers. Looking back on my experiences, I remember that I had
started to give more attention to my appraisal after being promoted to division
director. I thought about my relative competitiveness compared to other division
directors in order to receive a higher grade. I felt pressured (P1: division director,
started from Grade 5).
To this point the softening of support for 1/n is linked to MOSPA offering both
sanction and better reward, the latter appealing to shifts in attitudes and values,
including a growing acknowledgement of individualism.
Civil servants’ reframing also contributed towards a decline of 1/n because over time
civil servants participating in 1/n expressed unease and ambivalence around what they
were doing – recognition that adopting an oppositional standpoint, when obedience was
expected, created its own dilemmas irrespective of whether they were viewing the
original policy or the revised one (with the latter incorporating changes to appraisal and
reward differentials):
Civil servants have a duty of obedience and are supposed to comply with
regulations. Well, the practice of 1/n is resistance to the policy. From the point
of view of the policy making department, it should be corrected. Therefore, the
practice of 1/n is considered as noncompliance and violation of regulations.
Given that civil servants are in charge of policy and regulation, the fact that they
did not comply with policy created huge discomfort and anxiety… (P22: division
director, male, started from Grade 5).
The considerable uneasiness by civil servants in the adoption of 1/n, is
captured in the simple aphorism two wrongs don’t make a right. Thus despite
the perceived problems of P4P it was still a measure that carried central
authority. The subversive identity that ‘discreet resistance’ entailed was reluc-
tantly adopted by civil servants who acknowledged their enmeshment amongst a
complex web of professional values, organisational and identity and interpersonal
relationships. This reluctance did not disappear, and despite (productive) resis-
tance having buttressed collective culture and helping to improve acceptability of
appraisal does not fully account for the greater acceptance of P4P. The process of
individuals/groups coming to terms with change was a combination of individ-
uals’ reframing of the issues, and outside intervention (Randall and Procter 2008,
688). Accommodating newly introduced value systems, such as those underpin-
ning public management reform initiatives, may entail tensions with prevailing
values. The resolution of these tensions is an ongoing process of interplay
involving, on the one hand, a reframing of subjectivities and, on the other,
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enforcement by central political bodies. However, even as this reframing of
subjectivities is underway more established values retain power to reassert
themselves during this process and this is seen in the re-institutionalisation of
values represented by the seniority-based appraisal system.
3) Seniority-based appraisal
Discussion is not some linear account of resistance to an externally-driven change or
where collectivism is displaced by individualism. In the revised P4P arrangements,
alongside greater incentives there was also a further, paradoxical, result. P4P was not
implemented in a way that mirrored NPM principles of talent and effort being more
clearly linked to rewards. Instead there was development of seniority-based appraisal.
A central tenet of Confucian thinking is hierarchy and this development of P4P points
to the enduring strength of key values. Thus a linchpin of the revised P4P system was
an appraisal system whose processes were hierarchical and conservative. Some respon-
dents reported frustration with this seniority-based appraisal, and one Senior Civil
Servant recruited from the private sector expressed surprise at the low level of
individualism and competition within the P4P system. But despite these dissenting
views there was no return to the 1/n response that existed earlier in the change. The P4P
that finally emerges is then a curious blend of individualism (incentives) and hierarchy
(the appraisal system). As Haverman and Rao (1997: 1620) note an environment of
multiple competing institutional mandates may lead to the emergence of hybrid forms
that combine various properties.
Conclusion
The discussion is one of institutionalisation, deinstitutionalisation and re-
institutionalisation, and which encompasses political, functional and social dy-
namics (Oliver 1992). Political dynamics include the challenges facing the Korean
economy, political mandate for change and NPM aspirations. Functional ones are
changes to the rewards and appraisal system and the spatial location of work-
places. Whilst social dynamics include how employees’ age, rank and recruitment
method contribute to a weakening of socialisation. In detailing what gave rise to
such a ‘discreet’ form of resistance and its changing shape the article focussed on
the nuances of a multidimensional response (Piderit 2000). The account has
pointed to the differences – across work-site, recruitment method, age – of those
participating in 1/n, questioning a prevailing assumption of a homogenous civil
service values and frames. The pressures for deinstitutionalisation – whether
functional, political or social – do not automatically lead to a breakdown of
norms. Individual interviews identified how group and organisation context were
crucial in making sense of the change, and qualitative data focuses attention on
how reactions were initially perceived, and subsequently revised, as context
shifted. At issue is how attitudes and values are evolving and reshaping, but also
reasserting their identity across place and over time. The experience of 1/n was a
peculiarly Confucian-influenced response to a change and something of a very
modern Korean resolution. Potentially at least, 1/n exemplifies a number of
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ongoing transitions and tensions evident within the Korean civil service, for
example manifest in how work-life balance and gender equality are addressed.
In terms of its understanding of productive resistance the article’s conclusion is
three-fold. First, given diverse cultural settings there are nuances in the definition of
productive resistance and as presented here it is neither a simple reading of intention;
nor is it a straightforward example of apathy. Rather it emerged from the complexity of
organisational fabric and agency. Second, productive resistance must be seen as part of
a process that does not simply reflect ‘offer and counter-offer’. How and whether
productive resistance becomes integrated in a final policy change may sometimes
appear contradictory: ‘Schemas may be more or less mutable; they may embody
internal contradictions; or multiple schemas or institutional rules may be potentially
relevant to a context for action’ (Clemens and Cook 1999, 447). Thirdly, there will be
differences within groups and collectives concerning commitment towards resistance.
These differences may only be fully apparent when time has lapsed and interpretations
of resistance – productive or otherwise – can be put forward by those analysing the
change.
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